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WILL BIG TOBACCO SEEK BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION?
A $145 BILLION VERDICT POSES THE QUESTION
MARK GOTITLIEB* & RICHARD A. DAYNARDt
The wave of tobacco litigation that began in 1994 with the
emergence of secret, damning internal industry documents,' charges of
nicotine manipulation,2 and the memorable congressional testimony of Big
Tobacco's CEOs,3 has finally come ashore in the form of nearly $400
billion in judgments and settlements. 4
This seemingly staggering amount may only be the beginning as
the beleaguered tobacco industry faces an increasingly full trial calendar
over the next several years. Tobacco companies continue to place their
faith in their appellate track record and ability to generate colossal cash
with price increases. But in the face of such staggering debts and future
liability, the time has come to ask whether Big Tobacco might ultimately
be forced to seek Chapter 11 relief in a bankruptcy court? If the answer is
yes, that court would be faced with a uniquely difficult task.
" Mark Gottlieb is a staff attorney for the Tobacco Products Liability Project of the
Tobacco Control Resources Center, Northeastern University School of Law and Legal
Editor of the Tobacco Products Litigation Reporter. This publication was made possible
by Grant Number 263-MQ-009752 from the National Cancer Institute. Its contents are
solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views
of the National Cancer Institute or National Institutes of Health.
t Richard A. Daynard is Professor of Law at Northeastern University in Boston and
Chairman of the Tobacco Products Liability Project.
1 STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996).
2 Day One. Smokescreen, Part One (ABC News television broadcast, Feb. 28, 1994).
3 See Nicotine and Cigarettes: Hearing Before Subcomm. On Health and the Env 't of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. (1994) (statements of seven Big
Tobacco CEOs), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/
timelines/april94.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
4 Figure arrived at by adding 25 years of estimated payments to states based on the
Master Settlement Agreement and individual settlements by the remaining four states
(Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota), and the $145 billion punitive damages
verdict in a Florida class action that is currently under appeal.
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I. THE $145 BILLION VERDICT
On the 211th anniversary of the Bastille prison uprising that
signaled the birth of the French Revolution, a Florida jury in the Engle
class action trial5 may have started a litigation revolution of its own by
issuing a jaw-dropping punitive damages verdict against the tobacco
industry totaling approximately $145 billion.6
This unprecedented punitive damage award came in the third
round of verdicts handed down by the Engle jury. A year earlier, the six
jurors found that cigarette smoking caused twenty diseases, and that the
five cigarette manufacturer defendants individually and in conspiracy with
each other and two trade groups they had created committed a variety of
torts, including fraud and fraudulent concealment. 7 Then, in April 2000,
the same jury found the defendants liable to three individual class
members, utterly rejecting the industry's claim that two of the class
members had the same rare form of lung cancer not related to smoking,
while the third developed his throat cancer from exposure to wood dust
rather than his many years of smoking.8 The jury awarded the plaintiffs
compensatory damages for medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and
suffering averaging more than $4 million each. 9
Unless the class is decertified or the verdicts reversed on appeal,
the trial will continue to its next phase. In the fourth and final phase of the
trial plan, the court must devise an expedited process to determine class
membership and compensatory damages for individual putative class
members. If an individual were successful, he or she would likely receive
a share of the punitive damages.' 0 If the original jury's compensatory
award is extrapolated to the 250,000 or more estimated ill or deceased
Florida smokers comprising the class, the industry's obligation just to
5 Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL 33534572 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000).
6 The verdict breaks down among tobacco companies as follows: Philip Morris, Inc.-
$73.9 billion; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.-$36.2 billion; Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.-$17.5 billion; Lorillard Tobacco Co.-$16.2 billion; and Liggett Group, Inc.-
$790 million. Rick Bragg, Tobacco Lawsuit in Florida Yields Record Damages, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2000, at Al.
7 Barry Meier, Tobacco Industry Loses First Phase of Broad Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, July
8, 1999, at Al.
8 Catherine Wilson, Tobacco Loses First Class Action Suit, THE CoM. APPEAL, Apr. 8,
2000, at AI.
Id.
10 Daniel Wise, Tobacco Fee Bond Issue Planned, THE RECORDER, Apr. 23, 1999, at 1.
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Florida smokers could conceivably exceed $1 trillion, dwarfing the
punitive damages verdict. Moreover, there are other states where an Engle
style class action could be played out.
While it is certainly possible that no other state judiciary will
choose to grapple with the management of a large class action such as
Engle, it seems more likely that at least some of the forty-nine other state
judiciaries will find that their injured citizens are entitled to the same
compensation as Florida's.
Had the Florida Legislature not intervened at the eleventh hour
with a cap on the appeal-bonding requirement of the lesser of $100 million
or 10% of net worth per defendant,' the tobacco industry would have had
to raise approximately $164 billion ($145 billion plus double the statutory
interest rate). The bonding requirement for appeal is designed to secure a
judgment during the appeals process and, up until now, had applied to
every other tort defendant/appellant in Florida.12 The state reportedly took
the action to protect its own $13 billion settlement with the tobacco
industry from the uncertainties of bankruptcy.13 Meanwhile, other settling
states hired bankruptcy counsel to investigate potential scenarios.14
While the Engle punitive damages awards may be reduced on
appeal, the likelihood of reversing the verdicts or decertifying the class is
remote. After a two-year civil trial featuring over 150 witnesses and
thousands of objections, appellate courts will have an enormous transcript
to review. It is hard to imagine how Florida's Third District Court of
Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court might meaningfully differentiate
between harmless errors and reversible errors that would have changed the
result. The jury, by all indications, absorbed a tremendous amount of
information, deliberated with care, and rejected virtually every argument
the tobacco industry made in the course of the trial.
Furthermore, the class was actually defined by Florida's Third
District Court of Appeal, 15 which, along with the Florida Supreme Court,
16
twice rejected attempts to decertify or otherwise derail the class. While
certainly not impossible, it would seem odd if the Florida Supreme Court
were to maintain the action for the duration of what may have been the
I H.B. 1721, 102th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 128.
12 Id.
Id.
14 Henry Weinstein & Myron Levin, States Brace for the Threat of Tobacco Suit
Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2000, at Al.
15R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
16 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 751 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1999); R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 682 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1996).
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longest jury trial in American civil litigation only to decertify the class
after the verdict has been rendered.
II. SETTLEMENT DEBT
The tobacco industry has quite a bit more to contend with than
appealling the Engle verdict. First and foremost, the industry agreed to
pay the states about $10 billion per year forever, to buy peace in the wake
of a flurry of lawsuits seeking Medicaid cost recovery and other
compensation for financial injuries to the states as well as violations of
consumer protection laws.' 7 Under a separate agreement, the industry also
owes over $8.2 billion to the outside counsel retained by the states.'
8
These staggering obligations might be just the start of tobacco industry
settlement burdens, depending on how pending and future claims are
handled.
While expensive, the settlements with the states may be seen as a
shrewd strategy for the tobacco companies because it ties state settlement
revenue to sales of tobacco products, creating a common interest among
the states and the industry. 19 It was precisely this sort of common interest
that motivated Florida's Legislature and Governor to change the rules of
the game to benefit the tobacco industry, altering the appeals bond
requirement weeks before the expected punitive damages award in the
Engle case.
III. PENDING CASES
Big Tobacco's problems certainly do not stop there. Federal Judge
Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York has indicated that he
would tentatively certify a mandatory national class action consisting of
the punitive damages claims of all tobacco-caused personal injuries.20
On September 22, 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice filed an
enormous lawsuit against the tobacco industry under the Medicare
Recovery Act and the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), seeking damages in the hundreds of billions
17 See Master Settlement Agreement, 13.6 TOBACCO PROD. LITIG. REP. § 223 (1998),
available at http://www.naag.org/tobac/index.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
18 See, e.g., Wise, supra note 10, at 1.
19Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 17, § 9(c)(1).
20 See Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99 CV 1988, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18743
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2000).
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of dollars and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.2 1 While the trial court
dismissed the medical cost recovery claim, it allowed the RICO
disgorgement claim to proceed to trial. The Justice Department's experts
have estimated the relevant ill-gotten gains to be as high as $926 billion. 22
In 2001, the White House spokesperson, Ari Fleischer, revealed
that the Bush administration was attempting to engage the tobacco
industry defendants to the action in a settlement dialogue while still
pursuing the litigation.23 If either of these tracks results in success for the
government, this could force the tobacco industry to bear another large
financial obligation and possibly place strong pressure on individual
companies to seek bankruptcy protection.
There are also hundreds of individual smokers' lawsuits against the
industry pending. Encouraged by the Engle verdict, thousands more will
likely follow. From 1999 through 2001, four jury verdicts in California
and Oregon produced three punitive damages awards ranging from $20
million to $100 million.24 In 2001, a Los Angeles Superior Court jury
awarded an individual lung cancer plaintiff an astounding $3 billion
punitive damages award against Philip Morris that was subsequently
reduced to $100 million by the trial judge.25 While none of these verdicts,
all presently under appeal, by themselves have the potential to financially
threaten the tobacco industry, merely managing the defense of thousands
of individual cases could prove impossible for the industry both
logistically and financially. This is particularly true if the industry is
forced to mount a trial defense in hundreds of such cases each year.
The tobacco industry could pay many hundreds of billions of
dollars if addicted consumers were willing to pay three, four, or five times
as much as they do now for the defendants' cigarettes. The demand for
cigarettes, however, is in fact somewhat inelastic, and the ability of
21 See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 76 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.D.C.
1999) ("On September, 22, 1999, the United States entered the fray by filing a lawsuit in
this Court alleging that it was injured as a result of largely the same misconduct as had
been alleged in the complaints filed by the foreign governments and by the union trust
funds.").
22 See Edward Walsh, Witness: Big Tobacco Made Millions Illegally, WASH. POST, Nov.
21, 2001, at A3.
23 Ari Fleischer, White House Briefing (June 20, 2001).
24 See Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. BC 226593 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County June
6, 2001); Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 303184 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. County Mar.
20, 2000); Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 995172 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. County Feb. 8,
1999); Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 970503957 (Ore. Cir. Ct. Multnomah County
Mar. 30, 1999).
25 Boeken, No. BC 226593.
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26
cigarette manufacturers to raise revenue by raising prices is limited. At
some point, many consumers will choose to quit or opt for less expensive
nicotine replacement therapies, or perhaps they will opt to purchase
tobacco products from new tobacco companies that do not yet carry the
liability burden of the current dominant industry players.
IV. A WORST-CASE SCENARIO FOR THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
The convergence of the various streams of financial pressures
caused by these legal woes may eventually force one or more tobacco
companies to seek bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 27 Under Chapter 11, a filing company continues to
operate under court approval of a reorganization plan as a "debtor-in-
possession." 28 Such a filing would present great challenges to the court.
One daunting issue is the sheer number of potential claimants. As
American tobacco-caused deaths and diseases now exceed one million
every year, the number of potential claims is simply staggering. Handling
these claims, from an administrative point of view, would be a massive
undertaking.
Foremost among the difficulties for the court approaching a
tobacco bankruptcy is the issue of future torts. The parties to the tobacco
bankruptcy would be reorganizing a company or companies as debtors-in-
possession in order to engage in precisely the same sort of activity that
caused the tort liability in the first place. How could they continue to do
business to pay off prior liability after the bankruptcy filing if they are
simply creating future liability at bankrupting levels in the process?
The problem relates to the requirement of "feasibility" under the
Bankruptcy Code.29 The court cannot confirm a plan for reorganization if
it is likely to result in "liquidation, or the need for further financial
reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the
plan. 3 0 The court would need to take into account the value of future tort
claimants whose claims have yet to mature in determining the feasibility
26 Jeffrey E. Harris, American Cigarette Manufacturers' Ability to Pay Damages.
Overview and Rough Calculation, 5 TOBACCO CONTROL 292 (1996).
27 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2000).
28 Id. § 1101.
29 Id. § 1129(a)(11).
30..
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of the reorganization plan.31 If the plan does not negate the likelihood of
substantial future liability, then it is unlikely to be confirmed by the court.
The importance of creditors being paid any significant amount
versus the feasibility of a plan where liability is continually created will
have to be weighed. If there is an obvious place where the public health
community may have a voice in such bankruptcy proceedings, it is in
determining whether a particular plan is feasible. If tobacco companies
are allowed to continue production-but in the least tortious way-an
analysis will have to be made to determine what aspects of production and
marketing create the greatest potential liability.
To reduce the possibility that future sales would create their own
massive liability, the bankruptcy court might well fashion a quasi-
regulatory regime that would require the manufacturer to make the product
as safe as possible, limit marketing and promotional activities, and compel
full disclosures to consumers that would tend to significantly reduce the
possibility of future torts.
The question of eventual bankruptcy for one or more tobacco
companies is hardly settled. With Congressional intervention or a reversal
of fortune in the courts, the industry could survive this spate of lawsuits
and continue to thrive well into the twenty-first century. However, the
increasing availability of documentary evidence of industry wrongdoing
and an energized plaintiffs' bar following several large punitive damages
verdicts makes it hard to believe that Big Tobacco can come up with new
and effective defense strategies to protect it from jurors as well-informed
as those in the successful Florida, Oregon, and California cases.
If a Chapter 11 tobacco company filing were eventually to occur,
how the bankruptcy plays out will likely be heavily influenced by the
judge overseeing the case and how much he or she will be willing to
address concerns such as public health and continued liability. Should the
court take into account those considerations, as we believe it would be
required to do, it could transform the tobacco industry more deeply than
any legislative or regulatory agency.
31 See, e.g., In re Aquaslide 'n' Dive Corp., 85 B.R. 545 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987).
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